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C2 of all support forces was a serious issue during recent disaster relief operations... the answer to "Who is in charge?" depended on to whom you posed the question. Lack of unity of effort led to overloaded support in some areas and not enough in others.

-Center for Army Lessons Learned, 06-11: Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
The images of Hurricane Katrina are still fresh in many minds. The world watched in awe as Mother Nature reminded us once again of her power. The water just never seemed to recede. America watched the victims and the heroes of the rescue operation with sorrow and shock but also with questions. Why couldn't rescuers get to the victims faster? How would our Nation do better next time?
In his testimony before a Senate Armed Services subcommittee in March of 2006, Paul McHale, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, stated that the military response was the largest ever undertaken by the United States with over 72,000 service members.
1 "DOD felt a sense of urgency and acted upon it," said Mr. McHale. 2 The military eventually responded to over ninety requests for assistance (RFAs) with 20
ships, 346 helicopters, and 68 fixed wing aircraft; providing over 26 million meals, treating 26,304 patients, and flying 16,525 sorties. 3 Those service members responding to the disaster came from the active and reserve components of each of our Armed Services but predominantly they came from the National Guard. There were over 50,000 Guardsmen from every state and territory. 4 The White House and GAO after action reports identified the relationship between state and federal authorities as an issue during Hurricane Katrina. The GAO's preliminary report identified a need to clearly define leadership roles and "lines of authority" between federal and state agencies well in advance of a catastrophic incident. 5 The GAO also notes that these same lessons had previously been identified after both Hurricanes Andrew in 1992 and Hugo in 1989. The press reported heavily on the conflicts and clashes between the federal and state political leaders during the Hurricane Katrina response. The picture at the tactical level was similarly confusing but units and agencies worked out solutions on their own initiative. In southwest Mississippi, the Commander of the 168 th Engineer Group from the National Guard ordered his platoons to move out to the county emergency management centers, often clearing the roads en route. At the same time, the Commander of the 22 nd Naval Construction Regiment, active duty and stationed in Gulfport, MS ordered his units to do the same thing. At multiple county EOCs leaders from both units met daily with county emergency managers to sort out what tasks each would accomplish.
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While the press highlighted the political clashes at the strategic level and tactical leaders took great initiative on the ground, there was confusion at the operational level that led to a lack of efficiency. The guardsmen were under the command of the Governors of Mississippi and Louisiana. The active component was under the command of the Commander, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and task organized under JTF-Katrina, formed from First Army. Even with all of its successes, the command and control structure among the military forces was a constant irritant that degraded relief operations. A force this large needed a clearly defined command and control structure in order to quickly accomplish the mission of saving lives and reducing suffering. This paper will address the specific issue of the relationship between active component and National Guard forces during the Hurricane Katrina response operations. When confronted with any situation, the American military turns to doctrine to identify solutions and best practices. In this case, Joint Doctrine did provide a framework for effective C2 and coordination for domestic disaster response operations but it was not well utilized. The challenge of this study is to use the doctrinal framework to develop a triad of command authorities, relationships, and operational areas that allow the rapid response to crisis situations by all portions of our military.
Before one can appreciate the complexity of C2 issues in a domestic disaster situation, it is important to understand the unique environment presented by operations within the United States. To this end, the first step is to define the correct terms as they apply to the given problem. This study will consider a review of current joint doctrine for command and control to include the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) concepts of command and control from the National Response Plan. Finally, an appraisal of some of the lessons learned from Hurricane Andrew and JTF-Andrew will provide a contrast to the situation encountered during Hurricane Katrina.
The topic of disaster response operations in the United States is much too broad for this paper and therefore requires scoping the problem. While worthy of further investigation, this paper is not intended to address the strategic topic of interagency cooperation at the department level. Instead this study deals strictly with the uniformed services and more specifically with the active component, under Title 10, and the National Guard, under either State Active Duty status or under Title 32 and their respective roles in domestic operations.
Title 10 refers to the U.S. Code, Title 10 -Armed Forces. It is the portion of the U.S. Code that directs who constitutes the Federal Armed Forces, what missions they will conduct, and who they will work for. forbids members of the active components of the Army and Air Force from enforcing laws. 13 Current Title 10 of the U.S. Code extends the law to include all active component forces. 14 For the purposes of this paper, the Posse Comitatus Act will simply be treated as restrictions on a portion of the available force; similar to the limitations that a national command authority could impose on its contribution to a multinational coalition force. 17 In the context of Hurricane Katrina, this paper will focus on the first category of domestic emergencies.
Since this analysis requires a review of federal law, joint doctrine, and DHS doctrine, it is critical to understand the definitions of key terms as they relate to command and control. Joint doctrine defines command as "the authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment." 18 Command and control is exercising that authority over the forces assigned under his command.
The doctrinal definition of unity of effort is "coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization -the product of successful unified status. The Governor refused for fear that she would lose control of her National Guard. 26 While the dual status option is a good option it brings some problems. The approval process takes time, the proposal to Governor Blanco took five days, and this does not lend itself as well to the crisis mode of disaster response as to the deliberate planning involved in a NSSE. 27 Topp concludes that despite the possibility to use a dual status commander, the best option is the Parallel Command Model, where forces remain under their respective statutory authorities and work in cooperation. This is the model exercised most frequently and was in fact the model employed during Hurricane Katrina. 28 JP 3-0, Joint
Operations describes the parallel C2 structure under the section about multinational participation. 29 Given the sovereignty of the President and Governors, the picture of a coalition fits well. Unfortunately, the problems identified in all the lessons learned reports remain unresolved. If, as already stated in law and policy, unity of command is not attainable then the goal must be unity of effort. In the doctrinal framework, the next pieces of the triad art to be examined are command relationships and the designation of the operational area. is the Principal Federal Official (PFO). In situations with multiple FCOs a PFO can be designated to coordinate the Federal response among them. While the FCO is a statutory position, the PFO is a position designated by policy and therefore has no "directive authority" over the FCO or any state officials. Thad Allen, USCG, as the PFO, Allen moved his headquarters to the USS Iwo Jima at New Orleans. 42 In contrast with the FEMA structure that used three operational areas, the JOA for JTF-Katrina was the entirety of the States of Louisiana and Mississippi. The JTF located its headquarters at Camp Shelby, Mississippi and eventually established a command post with the PFO on the USS Iwo Jima. From these two locations the JTF headquarters oversaw the more than 22,000 active duty service members operating over two states. 43 The size of the operational area was much different than the designated area for JTF-Andrew thirteen years earlier. Engineers to build a force of over 22,000 service members. 46 In addition, though not under the JTF's command, the Andrew was considered to be very successful. It was the largest in our Nation's history until Hurricane Katrina.
Reviewing the doctrinal framework between these two major operations shows one major similarity and one major distinction. For all of the discussion about needing unity of command for Hurricane Katrina, the command authorities were the same during Hurricane Andrew. JTF-Andrew was under the command of the U.S.
Army's Forces Command and the National Guard remained under the command of the Governor. Immediately after Hurricane Andrew passed over Florida, National Guard forces were on the scene with the first responders. They provided both law enforcement and humanitarian support. The active component forces did not begin to arrive until four days after landfall. As the active JTF arrived and began providing humanitarian support, the National Guard forces focused almost exclusively on law enforcement.
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Thus, by not federalizing the Florida National Guard during the crisis, each force was able to concentrate on separate but mutually supporting roles in the Hurricane Andrew humanitarian operation.
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There were no mentions in the GAO Reports or the Army Lessons Learned report of friction between the JTF leadership and the Florida National Guard during Hurricane Andrew.
A significant difference between Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina was the breadth of the damaged area.
Hurricane Andrew crashed into south Florida, hard, and then it passed into the Gulf of Mexico. Ironically, it continued as a hurricane and made landfall in Louisiana as a category-3 storm, although with minimal damage.
Hurricane Katrina impacted three states and caused the breach of the levees protecting New Orleans. JTF-Andrew had one major objective of providing civil support to Florida. JTF-Katrina had at least the two major objectives of providing civil support to Louisiana and to Mississippi. In addition, providing civil support to the city of New Orleans should have been an additional objective, requiring a distinct force to accomplish that objective and a separate operating area.
Joint Doctrine clearly does provide a framework for effective C2 and coordination for DSCA operations.
As Topp concluded, unity of effort, not unity of command, should be the goal. There are two areas that warrant further research. The first is the use of reserves in DSCA missions. As mentioned during the discussion of Title 10, the President is not authorized to order reserves to active duty for natural disasters. The GAO recommended in their reports after both Hurricane Andrew and Hurricane Katrina that Congress change these laws. Bringing the capabilities of the reserves to bear on a disaster response could save many lives. Assigning them to USNORTHCOM would also give the combatant commander with a force that he could use immediately. The other area that needs more research is the internal command and control measures that the National Guard uses for EMAC forces. This was outside the scope and topic of this paper but it was identified as a critical flaw in most of the lessons learned reports. EMAC provides a tremendous capability and it was critical to the National Guard response to Hurricane Katrina. After this test of the system, the next step is to research and make changes to the command and control system.
Hurricane Katrina was the largest military DSCA response in our country's history. Over seventy thousand service members responded from every branch of service and from the active component and the National Guard.
While original estimates of the death toll were in the tens of thousands, the heroics of these service members helped keep the final losses down to 1,330. 51 With those heroics in mind, it is important to review all of the lessons learned and make the next response even better. Command and control is an area that is well documented across all of joint doctrine. Establishing the command and control structure is a critical part of joint planning and, due to the complexities of domestic disaster responses, it is even more important in DSCA operations. As outlined in this study, the answer is in the doctrine.
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